Proven death sentences in 2014: 35 (USA), 61 (Iraq), 90 (Saudi Arabia), 289 (Iran).
You hear only about Iran, but there are countries that are worse:
In Nigeria, 659 death sentences were recorded in 2014, a jump of more than 500 compared with the 2013 figure of 141.
In Egypt, courts handed down at least 509 death sentences during 2014, 400 more than recorded during the previous year. This included mass death sentences against 37 people in April and 183 people in June following unfair mass trials.
From all countries above who do you think is on the biggest drug smuggling route of the world?
Afghanistan presently produces 80 percent of the world’s heroin which provides billions of dollars in illicit profits for the powerful drug Mafia. Heroin trafficking and production have flourished under US military occupation and transformed Afghanistan into a dysfunctional narco-colony.
In the past 30 years, 3,734 Iranian border guards have been killed and more than 12,000 wounded in clashes with smugglers.
Iran has a real problem with this:
Iran lies directly in the path of the world’s largest flow of heroin.
There are some analysts who describe Iran’s heroin addiction problem as the “worst in the world.” Estimates of the number of addicts vary widely – from one million to more than three million habitual drug users. A 2006 report estimated that 8 percent of the adult population was addicted to drugs.
Out of the 170,000 people in jail in Iran, 68,000 are there for drug trafficking and 32,000 are there because they are addicts.
So what should a 3rd world country crippled under sanctions do? Build more jails? Hold more costly prisoners? Be more morale than the US and stopping executions at all? Yes, should it? But then why are you not so much upset when there are death sentences in the US? Are death sentences, invasions, meddling in other countries ok when you are a democracy? Don’t you think these are double standards?
Also what do you think about: US police killings headed for 1,100 this year, with black Americans twice as likely to die. (The Guardian)
How convenient isn’t it? No court costs, no prison costs and no bad image, because all people only compare death sentence numbers. Also, let’s try a test: replace in the title of the Guardian article (above in blue) US with Iran, and black Americans by an arbitrary Iranian minority. The conclusion would be clear, right? (White) US republicans would be furious even the UN, Amnesty and Human Rights Watch would be all over the story.
Speaking of all this: Yes, Iran is a dictatorship, and yes every execution is one execution too much, but after reading this article it should be clear that we have clearly double standards here, we comfortably ignore Iran’s hard situation trying to stop drug smuggling (and thus also protecting not only Iran’s youth but also other countries down the road) while being under sanctions. It should be also clear that focusing on just Iran can only have one reason: political motivation.
A 2009 World Public Opinion poll found that 51 percent of Iranians hold a favorable opinion of Americans, a number consistent with other polls, meaning that Americans are more widely liked in Iran than anywhere else in the Middle East. The U.S. favorability rating isn’t even that high in U.S. allies India or Turkey, and is two and half times as high as in Egypt. The same survey found that almost two-thirds of Iranians support restoring diplomatic ties with the U.S. (Iranians’ view of U.S. leadership is much worse, at 8 percent as of early this year.) But even these figures are likely on the low end of actual sentiment, as many Iranians might fear expressing such views to a strange pollster, out of fear of drawing the suspicion of the authorities…
Interested in reading more about USA-Iran? Here is a nice collection: http://theotheriran.com/category/usa/
Putting two and two together, Mohammad Javad Zarif’s recent travels and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s recent chat with Saudi FM Adel al-Jubeir point to a coordinated push by Bashar al-Assad’s two biggest allies, Russia and Iran, to follow-up the nuclear deal by recharging some kind of peace process in Syria. In fact, Zarif is supposed to be in Moscow on Monday to meet with Lavrov and discuss, you got it, Syria.
So far, Russia’s efforts at building consensus on a Syrian deal that allows everybody to focus their fire on ISIS have been decidedly less successful than Iran’s, though to be fair Zarif has been mostly talking to friendly audiences in Lebanon (Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah) and Damascus (Assad himself), while Russia has been talking to the Saudis and the “legitimate” Syrian opposition. Lavrov’s meeting on Thursday with Khaled Khoja, the head of the Syrian National Coalition, apparently…
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Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif is on a bit of a diplomacy jag in the aftermath of reaching the nuclear agreement with the P5+1. On Tuesday and Wednesday he was in Lebanon, where he met with Lebanese Prime Minister (and acting President, on account of they don’t currently have one) Tammam Salam and other top Lebanese politicians, to talk about finding a way to end the Syrian civil war and to collaborate on regional security issues. He also met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and what makes that interesting is that Zarif’s chat with Nasrallah immediately preceded the announcement of a 48 hour ceasefire in the Syrian border town of Zabadani, where government/Hezbollah fighters have been pressing a force of Syrian rebels (mainly Ahrar al-Sham) pretty hard for the past several weeks. Talks on that ceasefire have reportedly been going on for a month, with Turkish
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Do you want to see more US friendly Iranians, or hear the stories from Americans who really have been in Iran instead of speculating about it from the far?
Are you interested in seeing how Iranians reacted to 9/11?
Visit this site to find more: http://theotheriran.com/category/usa/
Source for the photos: Huffington Post
Iran’s Jews have given the country a loyalty pledge in the face of cash offers aimed at encouraging them to move to Israel, the arch-enemy of its Islamic rulers.
The incentives — ranging from £5,000 a person to £30,000 for families — were offered from a special fund established by wealthy expatriate Jews in an effort to prompt a mass migration to Israel from among Iran’s 25,000-strong Jewish community. The offers were made with Israel’s official blessing and were additional to the usual state packages it provides to Jews emigrating from the diaspora.
However, the Society of Iranian Jews dismissed them as “immature political enticements” and said their national identity was not for sale.
The Israeli newspaper Ma’ariv reported that the incentives had been doubled after earlier offers of £2,500 a head failed to attract any Iranian Jews to leave for Israel.
Iran’s sole Jewish MP, Morris Motamed, said the offers were insulting and put the country’s Jews under pressure to prove their loyalty.
Despite the absence of diplomatic ties with Israel, Iranian Jews frequently go there to visit relatives.
I worked closely with the IAEA to investigate Iraq’s past nuclear weapons programme, and I have confidence in the IAEA’s ability to implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The provisions of the NPT are at the heart of the framework agreement with Iran, and the measures contained in it – which include sophisticated remote monitoring, and environmental sampling at undeclared facilities – should be more than adequate to establish whether or not it has diverted any nuclear material to a weapons programme. The framework agreement also calls for a range of verification measures beyond those required by the NPT. These cover centrifuge production and aspects of the uranium fuel cycle such as mining and processing, and are needed to verify that Iran isn’t engaged in covert uranium enrichment using a secret cache of centrifuges and unaccounted-for stocks of uranium ore. No notice inspections to investigate ‘possible military dimensions’, however, go far beyond anything required by the NPT. The question is whether such an intrusive measure is warranted or whether, as Iran argues, the inspections would infringe its legitimate security interests.
The facts appear to support Iran’s position. Countries subjected to intrusive no notice inspections have to be confident that the process isn’t actually an intelligence-led operation aimed at undermining their legitimate interests.
Iran signed the Joint Plan of Action in 2013, and has abided by the verification conditions it required without incident. This track record should count in its favour, especially when you consider the dubious results of no notice inspections since they were first carried out in 1991.
The intelligence about the ‘possible military dimensions’ of Iran’s nuclear programme is of questionable provenance and most of it is more than a dozen years old. The consequences of failure to reach a nuclear accord with Iran today are too serious for the world to embrace a process that has been so controversial while having so little impact on legitimate disarmament. This is especially true when the inspected party, as is the case with Iran, has agreed to implement stringent verification measures and has a proven track record of abiding by them. Iran has been put in the impossible position of having to prove a negative. If it accepts inspections based on allegations it knows to be baseless, then it’s opening itself up to an endless cycle of foreign intrusion into its military and security infrastructure, and the inability of inspectors to discover something of relevance will only reinforce the belief that something is being hidden. We saw this happen before in Iraq, and the end result was a war based on flawed intelligence and baseless accusations that left many thousands dead and a region in turmoil.
Read more how inspectors who should be neutral and trustable were forced to cooperate with CIA and cover up CIA operatives masked as inspectors: